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However, the study of influence must capture more than the attainment of specific preferences.
Influence studies should also be able to capture how and why and the extent to which certain ideas, norms, principles or rule interpretations influence policy outputs, thus producing change. For the research purpose of this paper, a 'law attainment' approach 4 has been developed as a method with which to study judicial influence. The 'law attainment' approach compares the interpretation of rules and principles as stated in judicial decisions with the final policy output as adopted by EU legislators. If judicial interpretations of rules and norms are realized in final policy outputs, judicial influence has been exercised. The 'law attainment' approach cannot, however, open the 'black box' between judicial decisions and legislative outputs (Klüver 2011, p. 8) . For this reason, this paper traces the political processes by which influence is exercised in the cases of working time and patients' rights in cross border healthcare, investigating the conditions under which CJEU decisions influence EU policy outputs.
Judicial influence on EU policy outputs occurs when the established regulatory status quo (SQ reg 1 ) is challenged by a new court-generated status quo (SQ Court ), which is then codified into or altered by EU legislation (SQ reg 2 ). In more general terms, this occurs when a court exercises judicial review on the basis of the constitution or a statute, which is then responded to by a legislative amendment. When SQ reg 2 equals SQ Court , full codification and thus maximum judicial influence have occurred. Politicians, however, must approve such codification. I expect that such approval depends on a) the legal clarity of judicial decisions themselves, b) how the Commission proposes to respond to the case law of the Court, and c) on institutional rules and the positions of the EU legislators, i.e., the European Council and the European Parliament.
Certainly, an examination of CJEU rulings' influence on EU legislative outputs does not capture the entire magnitude of court-driven change; however, I argue that investigating the specific link between the judiciary and subsequent legislation is of particular importance. First, if the principles and interpretations of the Court are adopted into legislation, they become generally enforceable, i.e., they change from being applicable on an individual case-by-case basis to having general implications (Wasserfallen, 2010) . A political codification of Court decisions thus increases legal certainty. Second, analyzing the dynamics between judicial and legislative politics is of great importance because doing so explores the ability of politicians to respond to law and thus establish the course of integration.
Below, I first present why EU social policy has been chosen with which to examine the relation between legal and political integration. Next, the scholarly debate on judicial-legislative interactions is presented. Against this backdrop, I develop a taxonomy of different types of political responses that may condition the extent of judicial influence. The type of political response is expected to depend on legal clarity, the position of the Commission, institutional rules and political positions. The analyses of judicial influence on EU social policy output from 1958-2014 and for two case studies follow. The paper concludes with the empirical and theoretical implications of the findings.
On case selection
The case study has been deemed the appropriate method for the research question's type of social enquiry because case studies allow us to examine the details of the dynamics and conditioning factors of judicial decisions as potential causes of institutional change, i.e., of EU policy outputs (Gerring, 2004, pp. 348-349) . The case study method may uncover new territory in the complex and dynamic relation between law and politics that large-n quantitative studies overlook. For this purpose, EU social policy has been selected for examination. I argue that EU social policy constitutes a strong test case (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 120-123) for uncovering a potential causal link and the mechanisms between legal and political integration because the policy fulfills two criteria. First, legal integration has occurred largely in the policy area. Second, when legal integration occurs, we should assume politicians will engage. As for the first criterion, 1017 EU social policy cases were decided by the CJEU from 1961-2014 from a total of 7547 cases, rendering social policy the area with the third-most Court cases within EU jurisdiction. 5 Only 5 The data on CJEU case law have been compiled using the Court of Justice of the European Union's database, curia.europa.eu. All judicial decisions between 1/1/1958 and 1/7/2014 have been compiled for cases ruled according to Articles 258 and 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article TFEU 258 lays down the infringement procedure according to which the European Commission can take a member state to the Court for noncompliance with EU law. Article 267 constitutes the preliminary reference procedure in which national courts can send preliminary references to the CJEU to obtain its interpretations of EU law (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012, p. 206) . The rulings have been sorted according to the CJEU's categories of substantive matters. The category of 'Approximation of laws' is not inserted in figure 1 because that category does not represent a policy area as such. The categories of 'social provisions' and 'social security' have been merged into one category in the figure.
6 agriculture and fisheries and the free movement of goods have had more cases before the CJEU than social provisions and social security. We thus have reasons to assume that legal integration may propel political integration in the social policy area, challenging politicians to respond to and change the established regulatory status quo. Concerning the second criterion, we assume that judicial interpretations of social legislation matter to politicians. EU social policy constitutes a policy field in which much is at stake, and politicians disagree on the way forward (Ferrera, 2005) . EU social policy is an area likely to create divergent political positions because of ideological controversies as well as the increased socio-economic heterogeneity of an EU comprising 28 member states (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012, pp. 436-438) . EU social policy often intersects with the internal market and thus divides political 
Dynamic or constrained courts? Proposing a taxonomy of judicial influence
Research on the judicialization of politics has grown considerably in national, comparative and international political studies. One string of research argues that courts are increasingly powerful in policy-making, enjoying considerable independence from legislative correction (Stone Sweet, 2000; 8 Woods & Hilbink, 2009; Alter, 2014) . In this view, courts are above politics, insulated from the correction of partisan politics. Legal interpretations can be important drivers of change, and politics lacks the capacity to override unwanted jurisprudence (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012) . Societal actors, including lawyers, are key to pushing for a judicial decision to have further implications by taking new cases to court or fighting for the general applicability of their cases on the streets. In this manner, parliaments and legislation may no longer have the final word, as they had in the times of parliamentary sovereignty (Harlow and Rawlings, 1992, p. 322) . The opposing string of research questions the ability of courts to create change. International courts' effectiveness depends whether court rulings are consistent with the preferences of governments (Carrubba and Gabel, 2015, p. 191 ff.). A court ruling against such preferences will be ineffectual. Domestic courts face similar problems of effectiveness (Vanberg, 2005; Miller, 2009) . Domestic courts lack executive means and therefore depend on political actors to implement their rulings (Staton and Moore, 2011, pp. 560-561) . Although acting from atop the legal hierarchy, the effect of the US Supreme Court is actually limited. The Court depends on social, administrative and political responses to its rulings for the rulings to have an effect that extends beyond the individual lawsuit (Rosenberg, 2008) . In the relation between court and congress, the latter remains powerful, able to override or quell unwanted judicial rulings (Fisher, 1988; Miller, 2009) .
Also studies on the effects of the CJEU on European integration have alternated between two different camps. A dynamic-court view of European integration proposes a broadly neo-functional logic of integration whereby case law produces political integration (Burley and Mattli, 1993; Mattli and Slaughter, 1995; Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998; Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012) . Neofunctional scholars have presented the integration dynamic using a stage model suggesting a 'virtuous circle' with causal links between different phases as follows: 1) Interaction or contracting between social actors creates a social demand for third-party dispute resolution. 2) Dispute resolutions will push for legislation. 3) This push for legislation in turn will stimulate more contracting and interaction as well as more dispute resolution and legislation (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998; Stone Sweet, 2000, pp. 194-203; 2010; Cichowski, 2007, p. 21) . The causal link between dispute resolution and legislation is the essence of how legal decisions influence policy outputs. According to Stone Sweet, 'judicialization of politics' has obtained a foothold in the European Union (Stone Sweet, 2010, p. 7) . Political decision-making has become judicialized, meaning that non-judicial actors are guided by court-developed rules (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998; Stone Sweet, 2000) . Judicialization creates a new type of legislative politics wherein 9 legislators 'routinely take decisions that they would not have taken in the absence of review, and governing majorities anticipate likely decisions of the court and constrain their behavior accordingly' (Stone Sweet, 2000, p. 202) . The fragmented nature of politics has enhanced judicial power and rendered it increasingly unlikely that unwanted judicialization can be overturned (Chichowski, 2006, p. 12; Kelemen, 2006, p. 105; Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012) . Instead, the dynamic-court view posits that the most likely type of political response to judicial lawmaking will be codification, implying that a new court-generated status quo will be incorporated into legislation as part of a self-sustaining dynamic.
EU regional integration interpreted from the constrained-court perspective assigns far less significance to the role of courts as movers in the making of broader change. Power remains within the control of member states, and judicial decisions have zero or only a modest effect on policy when they contradict political preferences. It is argued that EU member states control the CJEU and that the Court does not have the autonomy to rule against the more-powerful states but must bend to their interests (Garrett, 1992, p. 537, p. 552) . Member states that disagree with a judicial decision can respond in one of two ways: collectively at the European level and/or individually back home. They can work for a collective override of the decision either by means of treaty revision or through secondary legislation (Carrubba et al., 2008, p. 438; ; or they can decide not to comply with the case law, i.e., not implement the case law at the national level (Conant, 2002) . Politicians will respond by legislative override if a new court-generated status quo runs counter to political preferences. A new regulatory status quo overturning the Court will be adopted by politicians.
Scholars have recently revived these juxtaposed interpretations of the relation between legal and political integration. In the latest heated debate on the political power of the CJEU, proponents of neo-functionalism have asserted neo-functionalism's triumph, arguing that neofunctionalism has won 'by a landslide' over intergovernmentalism, claiming that there are no important examples of politicians overriding the Court in the history of European integration (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012, pp. 204-205) . However, the fact that it is increasingly difficult for politicians to override CJEU case law does not prove that political codification occurs or that politicians cannot shape judicial influence.
Lawyers, political scientists and historians have pointed to the conditioned nature of judicial influence, arguing that the Court's role in substantive policy-making is often overstated (Armstrong, 1998; Wincott, 2001, p. 192; Rasmussen, 2013) . The Court is one actor among many in the EU policy process, and the Court's influence is 'conditional and contingent' (Wincott, 2001, pp. 180-181) . The Court's influence depends on how a larger set of forces may align to overcome member states' resistance. In addition, how the Commission makes legislative use of case law can be decisive (Wincott, 2001, p. 189) . This suggests that the Commission's strategic use of a ruling is central to the ruling's broader effect. The Commission here becomes a key player in pushing forward a case or cluster of cases to produce a more general change (Schmidt, 2000) .
Thus, to reach more measured conclusions regarding judicial influence, we should enhance our understanding of legal/political interactions beyond producing either legislative codification or override. Moreover, we should improve our analytical ability to connect the dots between judicial decisions and policy output (Carrubba and Gabel, 2015, p. 215 Politicians may also respond by non-adoption, in which legislators disagree on how to respond to jurisprudence and no sufficient majority can be established to codify, modify or override judicial decisions. Non-adoption constitutes legislative gridlock, producing a stalemate among the legislators in which no legislation is adopted (Binder 1999) . Non-adoption implies a political deadlock, resulting in a non-decision. Legal uncertainty arises in the wake of a non-adoption.
To be able to capture 'the variable reach of law' in EU policy output, I have constructed a taxonomy of judicial influence. 8 The taxonomy of judicial influence establishes four types of political responses, leading to four different implications for and degrees of judicial influence, as established in Table 1 below. The different political responses will be traced in the empirical analysis below. 
Non-adoption
No political agreement on how to respond to SQ Court is adopted. A stalemate is created because a sufficient majority is not established on how to respond to jurisprudence. Legal uncertainty and sub-optimality result.
Override SQ Court is overturned by EU decision-making. No judicial influence on policy outputs.
Conditions of judicial influence
The taxonomy supports analysis of variations in judicial influence caused by different types of political responses. However, in general, we should most likely not expect politicians to respond to CJEU decisions. When judicial decisions only introduce minor or non-controversial change, we should expect politics to comply with jurisprudence without discussion. However, when legal integration challenges or changes the established institutional order, we should expect politicians to engage. In general, the likelihood of political response depends on the institutional and socioeconomic implications of judicial decisions.
Beyond such overall observations, three additional factors are expected to condition judicial influence on policy outputs. First, as previously hypothesized by Garrett and Kelemen, legal clarity is likely to affect interactions between law and politics (Garrett et. al., 1998, p. 158; Kelemen, 2001, p. 625) . When a CJEU law precedent has had time to mature and has developed consistently in one direction, legal clarity of jurisprudence increases. Legal and political disagreements regarding the requirements of established case law should thus decrease. Thus, the first expectation is that when legal clarity is high, judicial decisions will be codified into EU policy outputs.
Second, we expect the position of the Commission to be decisive regarding judicial influence (Schmidt, 2000; Pollack, 2003) . The Commission is the gatekeeper for jurisprudence to be introduced into the political process. The Commission is thus the agenda-setter in proposing an appropriate response to legal interpretations. By bringing in the voice of the judiciary, the Commission may acquire a particularly strong position from which to steer decision-making in a specific direction, capitalizing on the legitimacy of the Court (Alter & Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994, p. 542) . The Commission's institutional position on how to bring case law forward can be strategic. when we turn to the Court's interpretation of secondary legislation. Judicial decisions interpreting a regulation or a directive can be rewritten by a statute, which must usually be decided by qualified majority voting in the Council and by a majority in the European Parliament. In this institutional setting, the likelihood of legislative override depends on 1) the number of veto points and 2) the 13 ability of political actors to act in a sufficiently unified manner to mobilize such a veto point (Pollack, 2003) . As the European Parliament increasingly acts as a co-legislator, a legislative overturn of the Court's ruling is confronted with three veto points: 1) the Commission must first propose overriding judicial decision-making, 2) the Council must adopt a common position overturning the Court's decisions, and 3) the European Parliament must adopt such an overturn. As noted by Pollack, the voting rules of the European Union raise the institutional thresholds even higher (Pollack, 2003, pp. 170-171) . Qualified majority voting in the Council requires a supermajority of more than two-thirds of the Council votes. In addition, the European Parliament can either approve the Commission's proposal and the common position of the Council by a simple majority or reject the Council's common position by an absolute majority. In sum, EU thresholds to correct an unwanted CJEU decision by means of secondary legislation are lower than the thresholds of primary law but nevertheless "higher than the thresholds for constitutional amendment in most democratic states". Additionally, the thresholds exceed those of "the proverbial home of judicial activism, the United States" (Pollack, 2003, p. 171 ).
Because of the considerable institutional barriers, the judicial discretion of the CJEU is high, and, at first, this appears to confirm the neo-functional version of the 'judicialization of politics', wherein politicians tend to codify what the Court has previously stated. However, for such codification to occur, the same institutional thresholds shape the Court's influence on EU legislation. The same three veto points and the same voting rules apply for CJEU decisions to be codified into secondary legislation as follows: 1) The Commission must present a proposal aimed at codifying the case law of the Court.
2) The Council must adopt such a codification and mobilize a qualified majority among the member states.
3) The European Parliament must adopt the codification of the judicial decision by making its plenary majority. Institutional rules thus do not favor codification for override. Both outputs face extremely high thresholds. Codification may be a more likely output if judicial decisions are unimportant to politicians or non-controversial.
However, when litigation matters to politicians and positions for or against the litigation diverge, codification faces identical barriers as override faces. In such situations, modification becomes the more likely political response.
For judicial decisions to be adopted into political decisions, they must be supported by 
Court influence on EU social policy over time
The following analysis draws on an extensive novel dataset and conducts a 'law attainment' approach to compare the rules and principles generated by judicial decisions with the extent to which these rules and principles are adopted into final policy outputs. Three analytical steps have been undertaken to examine judicial influence over time, examining 1) whether Commission proposals refer to the case law of the Court, 2) whether the Commission proposes principles or provisions to adopt the case law of the Court, and 3) the extent to which the Council and the European Parliament adopt the case law of the Court as proposed by the Commission.
All new regulations, directives, and subsequent amendments adopted between January 1, 1958 and July 1, 2014 have been compiled. 9 Where they were possible to trace, rejected policy proposals were also included in the compilation. Prior to July 2014, EU legislators adopted 125 binding acts in social and health policies. All original Commission proposals were collected and coded for their reference to the jurisprudence of the Court. 10 The proposals were coded for whether the Commission referred to the case law of the CJEU in its justifications of a proposal, i.e., in the explanatory memoranda and recitals of a proposal. The coding was binary: no = 0, yes = 1. 11 The coding was performed manually; three researchers examined all proposals in turn to ensure intercoder reliability. Unlike studies of 'preference attainment', we chose not to rely on quantitative text analysis programs such as 'wordfish' 12 or similar computer programs to distinguish when a proposal referred to the Court and when it justified or reasoned a policy change on the basis of jurisprudence. Forty policy proposals referred to the Court's jurisprudence.
The Court as justification
As the second analytical step, the 40 proposals referring to the Court were examined to determine whether reference to the Court was justifying or reasoning specific provisions or principles in the proposal. In 22 of the 40 proposals, the Commission used such a reference as justification for provisions or principles, often referring to specific case law of the Court (see Annex 1, column on reference to specific case law). These 22 proposals were further analyzed according to the classification of the taxonomy. As a first step, the response of the Commission was examined, i.e., whether the Commission proposed to codify, modify or override the new status quo established by the court (see Annex 1, column on Commission response). The taxonomy's category of 'nonadoption' was irrelevant in relation to the Commission's proposals.
In 17 of the 22 proposals, the Commission proposed codifying the case law of the Court, demonstrating that the Commission often, but not always, proposes codifying the case law when referring to previous jurisprudence. Three proposals were aimed at modifying the case law and two at overriding the Court ruling.
10 The early Commission proposals were difficult to acquire because these proposals are not online and were not in the hands of relevant ministries or information offices. However, with the help of the 'Historical Archives of the Commission', we managed to collect the early original proposals, allowing us to work with the full sample of 125 proposals.
11 The coding of CJEU was (0 = No; 1 = Yes). The following search words were used as proxies for reference to the case law: 'Court of Justice', 'European Court of Justice', 'case law', 'jurisprudence', 'judgments', 'the Court', 'ECJ', and 'CJEU' as well as reference to specific judgments. In those proposals, only available in French, the following words were used as proxies: 'La cour de justice', 'la cour', 'jurisprudence'.
In the proposal for a Posted Workers Directive COM (91) (Conant 2002, 192-194) as it did in the proposal COM (2004) The UK protest against the legal basis was not accepted, and after three years of negotiations, the Council adopted the Working Time Directive (Directive 93/104/EC of 23.
November 1993). Thus, a regulatory status quo was established (SQ reg 1 ). The directive establishes a maximum 48-hour work week within a reference period of four months, minimum daily and weekly rest periods, and a minimum of 4 weeks paid leave per year. At that time, working time was defined as 'any period during which the worker is working, at the employer's disposal and carrying out his activity or duties', and rest periods were defined as 'any period which is not working time '. 15 However, to satisfy the United Kingdom, the member states won several opt-outs from core parts of the directive during negotiations.
In 2000, the CJEU produced its first judgment that seriously disturbed the established status quo on the definition of working time (SQ Court ). The preliminary reference was sent to the European Court by the Spanish Trade Union of Doctors in Public Service (SiMAP); this reference questioned whether on-call time for doctors was to count as working time. 16 The CJEU ruled that 15 Art. 2 (1) and (2) 
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doctors were not excluded from the directive although Article 2 (2) of the framework directive allows for the exemption of public service activities that maintain public order and security.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that on-call time spent at a healthcare institution constituted working time within the meaning of the directive. The Jaeger 17 case followed in 2003. In the Jaeger case, a higher German labor court asked the CJEU if time spent on-call, but inactively, counted as working time although the doctor may sleep during that time. The CJEU's conclusions were largely a restatement of the SiMAP ruling, that on-call time in which the doctor must be physically present at the hospital is working time within the meaning of the directive, regardless of whether he or she can rest. Jaeger irrevocably clarified that the inclusion of on-call time as working time applied generally and not specifically to the Spanish system. Legal clarity had been established.
Political responses
Despite the legal certainty of jurisprudence, many countries flouted the CJEU conclusions and did However, the member states experienced internal disagreement regarding the question of opt-out. The Council, however, took the common position that it needed to avoid the 'negative effects' of the case law (Council press release PRES/2007/284). The purpose of negotiations was stated as the following:
"…to avoid any consequences of the European Court of Justice's case law, in particular rulings in the SiMAP and Jaeger cases, which held that on-call duty performed by health professionals and other workers, when they are required to be physically present at their places of work, must be regarded as working time"
(Council press release, PRES/2006/298).
Throughout the negotiations, the EP firmly supported scrapping the opt-out (Financial Times, 16 December 2008). Inter-institutional negotiations were taken all the way up to the third reading; however, the EP and the Council did not manage to establish an agreement because of the opt-out.
Positions remained fixed. Concerning the case law of the Court, the EP gradually developed a more dynamic position. During its second reading, the EP thus accepted that the 'inactive part of on-call time working time' could be calculated in a special way to comply with the maximum weekly 48-hour work week. 18 The inactive part of on-call working time continued to be defined as working time but could be calculated differently (Interviews, European Parliament, 29 March 2012; social partners 28 January 2013). In this manner, the EP took a considerable step toward meeting the Council and the Commission, opening up the possibility of a modification of legal integration.
However, the EP was not willing to accept the opt-out; thus, its general position remained fixed. 
Judicial influence on the EU working time regulation
It could be argued that because the case law of the Court had not been modified or overridden, the rulings constitute the regulatory status quo and thus the individual lawsuits generated change. 24 member states and reimbursed in the home state if it has been authorized beforehand by the competent national authority. SQ reg 1 was thus one of considerable national control, with nearly no free movement for planned health care services or patients. However, the original regulation reimbursed the full expenses of cross border care for those authorized to go abroad, thus ensuring equality between patients able to afford eventual extra costs and those unable to afford such care.
The high degree of national control established by the regulatory status quo was challenged by a line of CJEU case law specifying that healthcare is not exempted from single market principles.
In 1998, the Decker and Kohll cases 21 established that healthcare is a service covered by the meaning of the treaty. In the subsequent Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms case, 22 the Court clarified that internal market principles also apply to hospital care. In the ensuing case of Müller- 
Political responses
The Commission's first attempt to respond to the case law of the Court came with its proposal for a Service Directive that proposed that healthcare would be part of the Directive (COM (2004) 2).
Thus, in the Commission's Service Directive proposal, Article 23 sought to codify the case law of the Court. However, the health ministers refused to have their policy area regulated as part of a general directive on services and placed under the aegis of the Directorate General (DG) for the Internal Market (Szyszczak, 2011, pp. 116-117) . Thus, the Commission's first attempt to codify judicial decisions was rejected. group urged the Commission to withdraw the proposal, arguing that it would have considerable negative consequences for national healthcare systems (Politiken, 11 January, 2008; Politiken, 19 January, 2008; Interview, European Parliament, February 2009) . Against this background, the second attempt to respond to the case law of the Court was withdrawn.
On voting. Additionally, the European Parliament was able to establish a compromise between the three major groups, allowing for more national control of cross-border healthcare and proposing to strengthen rights for patients with rare diseases as well as stipulating that patients should not pay up front for treatment in an effort to improve equality. These two EP proposals were, however, not accepted by the Council, and a final compromise was established, largely mirroring the Council's common position of extended national control. By March 2011, both legislatures had adopted the directive. Although positions diverged within and between institutions from the outset, they were dynamic and changed as interaction unfolded.
Judicial influence on the EU patients' rights directive
Despite the legal clarity of precedents, judicial decisions were not codified into the final EU policy output, nor was the Commission-proposed response to the case law approved by EU legislators. The over what can be consumed abroad (Hatzopoulos and Hervey, 2013) . The CJEU had not needed to do so, given that its previous rulings were based on primary law, thus, in stricto sensu, only changeable by means of a treaty amendment. Therefore, the adaptive behavior of the Court is even more notable.
Conclusion
Studies of judicial-legislative interactions in the EU tend to rely on a progressive narrative of judicial impact, creating an image of 'politics under law' (Armstrong, 1998, p. 163; Conant, 2002, p. 15; Rasmussen, 2013 Rasmussen, , p. 1195 . A plausible yet unexplored causal link between legal and political integration has been key to the dynamic-court view of how the CJEU may advance political change. The taxonomy developed in this paper presents a broader spectrum of political responses to judicial dynamics than previous theoretical discussions have relied on. 27 The taxonomy thus opens up discussion of the more subtle interactions between law and politics than the somewhat juxtaposed understanding of political responses as either codification or override.
Because empirical evidence on override has seldom been collected, theoretical interpretations of rather unrestrained Court power have recently claimed superiority (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2012) .
However, the findings of this paper show that the inability to override does not imply legislative approval of judicial decisions.
The findings, however, do not disconfirm that judicial decisions can influence EU policy outputs. Important institutional change can certainly be set in motion because of a new Court-generated status quo, which will then limit the policy options available to politicians. But this may again provoke political counter responses (Alter & Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994 conflicts. In addition, the Court may adapt to a legislative modification and change legal reasoning.
As shown in the analysis of patients' rights, the CJEU can be responsive to political reactions. Here, the CJEU has recently tempered its line of reasoning. Although it could have ignored the legislative modification because SQ Court was based on primary law, the CJEU has in fact "backtracked from its former 'revolutionary' stance" (Hatzopoulos and Hervey, 2013, p. 2) .
Second, the Commission does not always side with the Court. It is selective as to which of the 1,017 Court cases it brings into the process and sometimes proposes modifying or even overriding the case law of the Court. Although it is an important gatekeeper, the Commission does not sit firmly in the driver's seat as an authority or strategic actor. The responses of the European Parliament and the Council may differ starkly from the Commission. Rather than strategic behavior, the adaptive behavior of the Commission appears to be important; after two defeats, the Commission's willingness to change its position rendered it possible to adopt a much modified patients' rights directive. the Court is no independent mover of political change. This substantiates that even in polities where judicialization should be especially strong (Kelemen, 2013, p. 295) , legislative politics can condition its effect. In domestic judicial-legislative interactions, we should expect politics to have stronger voice against unwelcome judgments. The findings of this study invite comparative studies of judicialization to look beyond legislative override as the only meaningful counteraction through which politics can respond to law. There are other responses to 'quell unfavorable judgments' (Hirschl, 2009, 827; Fisher, 1988, p. 200 ff.) . Modification is one such response. Non-adoption as political gridlock is another. To develop a more accurate understanding of judicial power and effect, we must also examine the boundaries of judicialization and see how the continuous interplay between law and politics set the scope and limits of Union integration.
